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INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Legislature has attempted to create a new era of
health care insurance for uninsured and underinsured residents of
Minnesota. The rising costs of medical services,' coupled with an
alarming number of people without adequate health insurance,2
1. According to one recent report, on average families spent nine percent of
their annual income on health payments in 1980 and 11.7% in 1991. FAMILIES USA
FOUNDATION, HEALTH SPENDING: THE GROWING THREAT TO THE FAMILY BUDGET (Dec.
1991). Spending is projected to reach a level of 16.4% of family income by the year
2000. Id.
2. Within the United States, one report estimated there are nearly 34 million
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have driven the issue of state subsidized health insurance to the forefront of political debate. Enacted in 1992, MinnesotaCare seeks "to
lay a new foundation for the delivery and financing of health care in
Minnesota. . ..

"3

By passing MinnesotaCare, one of the first com-

prehensive health care reform plans, Minnesota has taken the initial
step down the path of what many people see as inevitable state-subsidized medical insurance for the underinsured and uninsured.4
The most heavily debated issue in MinnesotaCare was its source of
financing.5 Although the funding of MinnesotaCare is spread among
several different sources, 6 the most contentious source involves a
two-percent revenue tax upon resident7 and nonresident health care
providers. 8 The tax on nonresident health care providers is yet anuninsured people. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, LONG-TERM STRATEGIES FOR
HEALTH CARE, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (Apr. 16, 1991).
3. The Minnesota Health Right Act, Ch. 549, art. 1, § 1, 1992 Minn. Laws 1487,
1488 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 62J.015 (1992)). The recently enacted MinnesotaCare has already undergone an attack upon its name. When originally conceived, the
statute was referred to as HealthRight. Donna Halvorsen & Tom Hamburger,
Durenberger Says Health-Care Law Waiver Won't Be Granted This Session, MPLS. STAR TRIB.,
Sept. 26, 1992, at lB. This name was changed after potential copyright infringement
problems arose. Id. The statute was finally given its present title of MinnesotaCare.
Ch. 247, art. 4, § 18, 1993 Minn. Laws 1365, 1397. For convenience, the Act will be
referred to as "MinnesotaCare" and citation will be made according to Minnesota
Statutes where appropriate.
4. KeithJ. Halleland & S. Olivia Mastry, Health Right: Eliciting Health Care Reform,
49 BENCH & BAR OF MINN. 14 (August 1992).
5. Keith J. Halleland & S. Olivia Mastry, HealthRights Mandate for Change, 75
MINN. MED. 35, 36-37 (1992).
6. This Comment focuses mainly on the funding derived from the imposition of
a two percent gross revenue tax on nonresident health care providers; MinnesotaCare's funding, however, is spread out among several different sources. MinnesotaCare calls for revenue contributions from the following sources: (1) a five percent tax
increase on cigarettes; (2) a two percent tax on gross revenues of wholesale drug
distributors; (3) a two percent gross revenue tax on hospitals and other health care
providers; and (4) a tax on persons receiving "prescription drugs for resale or use in
Minnesota, other than from [a distributor covered in subdivision 3] ... equal to two
percent of the price paid." The Minnesota Health Right Act, Ch. 549, art. 9, §§ 7(1)(4), 16, 992 Minn. Laws 1487, 1613, 1616.
7. MINN. STAT. § 60A.15(1) (1992). MinnesotaCare mandates the levying of a
gross revenue tax upon hospitals, surgical centers, and other health care providers.
Id. § 295.50. For purposes of convenience, in this Comment, these different medical
entities will be referred to collectively as "health care providers."
8. Id. § 60A.15(l)(a). In relevant part, the statute states:
every domestic and foreign company, including town and farmers' mutual
insurance companies, domestic mutual insurance companies, health maintenance organizations, and nonprofit health service corporations, shall pay to
the commissioner of revenue installments equal to one-third of the insurer's
total estimated tax for the current year. [I]nstallments must be based on a
sum equal to two percent of the premiums ....
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other form of the often litigated sales and use taxes employed by
states to recover revenue on goods and services sold to its residents.
This Comment will analyze the portions of MinnesotaCare that address the financing of the insurance program and specifically the revenue raised from taxing nonresident health care providers. This
Comment will emphasize the difficulties likely to be encountered by
Minnesota in seeking to enforce the tax, especially in light of due
process and Commerce Clause limitations on a state's ability to tax
interstate commerce.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF MINNESOTACARE

On April 23, 1992, Governor Arne H. Carlson signed into law the
controversial health care reform legislation, MinnesotaCare. The
complexity of the law and its lofty objectives were matched only by
its overwhelming length.9 MinnesotaCare listed a plethora of objectiveslo but sought mainly to address two recurring problems burdening the health care industry: the lack of cost containment for health
care services and insufficient access to adequate health insurance."I
The cost of health care sharply increased during the past decade.
One recent study released by Families USA Foundation stated that
nationwide the average health payments for a typical family increased by over 146% from 1980 to 1991.12 Based on current
trends in inflation and the economy, this study predicted that American families will on average pay $9,397 each year for health care by
the year 2000. This represents a 439% increase over the last two
decades.13 Cognizant of these predictions, Minnesota became one
of the first states in the nation to pass legislation to combat this ris9. In its entirety, MinnesotaCare encompasses 133 pages of single spaced text
and outlined plans to control rising health care costs, to reform health insurance
practices, and to increase access to insurance and care for the underinsured and
uninsured.
10. While MinnesotaCare sought to maintain health care costs at an acceptable
level and increase the accessibility of adequate health insurance, some of its other
goals include: (1) reform of the insurance industry by providing plans for both small
employer's and individual's plans; (2) expansion of benefits provided under the 1990
Children's Health Plan; (3) implementation of programs to increase the quality of
health care in rural Minnesota; (4) collection of data and research; and (5) promotion
of alternative dispute resolution by defining standards for use in defending charges
of medical malpractice.
11. The Minnesota Legislature, in fact, found cost containment to be of such
great importance that article I of the Act is devoted solely to cost containment measures. MINN. STAT. §§ 62J.015-.29 (1992).
12. FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, HEALTH SPENDING: THE GROWING THREAT TO
THE FAMILY BUDGET, 1 (Dec. 1991). This study revealed that health payments for the
average American family totalled $4,296 in 1991, an increase of more than $2,500 for
the same amount of health services in 1980. Id.
13. Id.
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ing national problem.14

A.

Background

In September 1989, the Minnesota Health Care Access Commission was appointed by Governor Rudy Perpich and was charged with
the task of recommending a comprehensive plan to provide access to
health care for all Minnesotans.15 The commission found that access
to health care was a major problem for most Minnesotans, a problem
attributed to insurance practices and high costs throughout the system.16 While the problem appeared intensified in rural areas, the
commission concluded that adequate access to health care was an
achievable goal.1 7 Also included in the commission's report was a
plan designed to improve management of health care costs.' 8

The commission further noted that insurance rates varied greatly
among individuals because insurance adjusters used personal factors
such as gender, current health status, and preexisting health conditions to set rates for each individual.19 Opponents of this method
alleged that such practices discriminate against women, the sick, and
the elderly. These perceived injustices, along with the high level of
noncoverage in Minnesota, provided the impetus for the commission's proposed reform of rate setting policies within the insurance
industry.20

This proposed reform was the commission's most important rec14. In passing MinnesotaCare, Minnesota joins the growing list of states that
have enacted some form of health care reform legislation. See Arthur L. Caplan &
Paul A. Ogren, Do The Right Thing: Minnesota's HealthRight Program, 22 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 4, (Sept.-Oct. 1992). Those states preceding Minnesota in passing such
legislation include Massachusetts, New York, Oregon and Vermont. Id. Of these
states, Massachusetts and Oregon have the boldest legislation. In 1988, Massachusetts passed legislation that included tax credits to small employers that initiated
health coverage for workers and attempted to provide universal health insurance by
imposing a $1680 fee on all employers with six or more employees. Alan Sager,
Prices of Equitable Access: The New Massachusetts Health Insurance Law, 18 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 21, 24 (June-July 1988). Likewise, the 1989 Oregon legislation attempted to provide basic health care benefits, through Medicaid, to an increased
number of people but limited the number of services covered to control expenditures. See Robert Steinbrook & Bernard Lo, The Oregon Medicaid Demonstration ProjectWill It ProvideAdequate Medical Care?, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 340, 340-44 (1992). Each
plan has failed to meet its expectations. The Massachusetts legislation encountered
problems in the face of the recession, and the Oregon legislation has been criticized
as "rationing health care for the poor." Caplan & Ogren, supra, at 4.
15. THE MINNESOTA HEALTH CARE ACCESS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE, 77th Leg., 1st Sess., at 5 (Jan. 1991) [hereinafter COMMISSION].
16. Id. at 4-5.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 5-7.
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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ommendation.21 The commission recommended changing the rate
justification from one based on health status, gender and preexisting
conditions to a system utilizing a "community rating" method of premium rate setting.22 Under a community rating method, insurance
premium rates would generally decrease because the average overall
community health determines the rate, and the health of the individual insured becomes irrelevant. Costs are spread out to all members
of the community, underwriting the higher health care expenses of
women, children, and the aged.23
B.

Legislative Action

Senator Linda Berglin and Representative Paul A. Ogren introduced the MinnesotaCare bill to the legislature. Although the bill
enjoyed a surprising amount of bipartisan support, concerns over
the bill's complexity and financing hampered its passage.
1.

Changes in Rate Determination

MinnesotaCare mandates radical changes in current industry-wide
insurance practices, including underwriting and rating practices for
individuals and small businesses.24 The purpose of the proposed insurance reform is to combat the increasing costs of health care and
to lower the burden of these costs throughout the state. 25 A series of
restrictions have been placed upon insurers' ability to determine
rates and coverage to aid employers and individuals in obtaining
health insurance.26 For example, health carriers may not cancel or
fail to renew a policy due to the health status of the policy holder,27
21. COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 8.
22. Id. at 53-60. Under a community rating method, premium rates are "based
on the average cost of actual or anticipated health care used by all subscribers in a
specific geographic area." HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, A
DISCURSIVE DICTIONARY ON HEALTH CARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., 33 (Feb. 1976).
The community rating method spreads the costs of health care-specifically illnesses-evenly across the entire community rather than charging individuals based
on personal factors. Id. One advantage of such a rating system is that premiums do
not vary from individual to individual because of factors such as age, sex, or existing
health status. Id.
23. COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 15. The commission viewed implementation
of the "community rating" method as an effective tool to control premium rates for
individual and small group plan holders by eliminating insurance restrictions because
of preexisting conditions and other factors causing health care costs and, correspondingly, premiums to increase. Id. at 16. In particular, the commission found
that current insurance practices discriminated against women, children, the elderly,
and those with disabilities or health problems. Id.
24. MINN. STAT. § 62L.03 (1992).
25. Id. § 62.015.
26. Id.
27. Id. § 62A.31(l).
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nor may they determine premium rates based upon the sex of the
insured.28
2.

Changes in Rural Health Care

The legislature also addressed the particular health care problems
of rural Minnesota. 2 9 Generally, policy holders in a rural locale pay
more for insurance than policy holders in a metropolitan area. To
address this problem, MinnesotaCare established an Office of Rural
HealthSO to increase the quality of health care in rural Minnesota. 3 '
For example, MinnesotaCare utilized the Rural Physician Education
Account 3 2 that provides for loan forgiveness incentives to medical
school residents who locate in rural Minnesota.33
3.

Collection of Data and Research

Another objective set forth in MinnesotaCare is the continuing
collection of data and research to "improve the efficiency and effectiveness of health care in Minnesota."34 A health care analysis unit
has been created to collect data to promote improvements in health
care provider efficiency and effectiveness35 and to develop outcome
based practice guidelines to ensure that appropriate and effective
care is rendered.36 Finally, the legislation seeks to promote alternative dispute resolution in medical malpractice cases3 7 and attempts
to streamline discovery.3 8
4.

Financing MinnesotaCare
a. Sin Tax

The financing of MinnesotaCare presented one of the bill's most
controversial aspects. The legislature decided to raise revenue for
the program by implementing a "sin tax" on cigarettes3 9 and a use
tax on health care providers.40 The cigarette tax consists of a five
cent tax increase in the already existing tax on each pack of cigarettes
28. Id. §§ 62L.08(5), 62A.65(4).
29. The Minnesota Health Right Act, Ch. 549, art. 5, 1992 Minn. Laws 1487,

1567-79.
30. MINN. STAT.§ 144.1482 (1992).
31. Id. § 144.1482(1)(4).

32.
33.

MINN. STAT.
MINN. STAT.

§ 136A.1355(3) (Supp. 1993).
§ 136A.1355(3) (1992).

34. Id. § 62J.30(2).

35. Id. § 62J.30(3)(4).
36. Id. § 62J.34(1).

37. Id. § 604.11(2).
38. MINN. STAT. § 604.11(3) (1992).
39. Id. §§ 297.02(1), 297.03(5).
40. Id. § 295.52 (1992).
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sold within the state.4 1
b. Use Tax
Conversely, the use tax has met with much debate. This hotly debated tax consists of a two-percent gross revenue tax on health care
providers, including doctors, hospitals, and drug wholesalers.42 A
similar one-percent tax was imposed on health maintenance organizations and nonprofit health service corporations.43
MinnesotaCare establishes a variety of different actions by which
out-of-state health care providers may fall within Minnesota's tax jurisdiction.44 These actions range from maintaining an office within
the state 45 to the solicitation of business from potential customers in
Minnesota.46 Regardless of the action, however, the state must still
establish some "nexus" between Minnesota and the business activities of the potentially taxed corporation.4 7
Of particular interest to out-of-state health care providers is MinnesotaCare's statutory presumption.48 In essence, this presumption
states that if, in any calendar year, more than twenty persons domiciled in Minnesota receive services from a health care provider, that
provider will be presumed to "regularly solicit business within Minnesota."4 9 The effect of this presumption is that an out-of-state
health care provider, maintaining no other contact with Minnesota,
will be presumed to have a nexus with the state and thus will be subject to the state's use tax.5 0 This statutory presumption provides an
excellent illustration of the tension that exists between Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce and a state's attempt to tax it.
41. Id. § 297.02(1).
42. Id. § 295.52.
43.

MINN. STAT § 60A.15(l)(e) (1992).

44. Id. § 295.51(1).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 295.51(l)(4).
47. For a state to impose a use tax upon an out-of-state corporation there must
exist, among other things, a substantial nexus. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). For a more comprehensive analysis of the Complete Auto
Transit requirements, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
48.

MINN. STAT. § 295.51(2).

49. Id. Specifically, the clause states that "[a] hospital or health care provider is
presumed to regularly solicit business within Minnesota if it receives gross receipts
for covered services from 20 or more patients domiciled in Minnesota in a calendar
year." Id. The statute provides no guidance or reasoning as to how twenty patients
were chosen as the cutoff point for imposition of the tax.
50. The statutory presumption, defining regular solicitation of business in Minnesota as providing services to twenty or more Minnesotans, indirectly establishes a
nexus between an out-of-state corporation and the state. See supra note 49.
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STATE TAXATION AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Historical Background

The scope of power afforded to Congress and denied to the states
in the realm of taxation has been a subject of litigation since 1827,
when the Supreme Court first struck down a state tax as violating the
Commerce Clause. In Brown v. Maryland,51 the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a state tax placed on goods introduced into the taxing state because taxation of such commerce was a power granted
exclusively to Congress via the Commerce Clause.52 Since Brown,
the Court has set forth a variety of approaches to address the problem of state taxation of interstate commerce. 53 At the outset, Con51. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). The Brown Court found
that a state imposing a $50 licensing fee upon "all importers of foreign articles, or
commodities of dry goods .
entering its boundaries violated the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 419.
52. Id. at 447.
53. At least six approaches have been utilized by the Supreme Court. See PAULJ.
HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION §§ 2:9-2:17 (1981 &
Supp. 1992). No single approach has enjoyed overwhelming success.
The first approach taken by the Court espoused the view that the Commerce
Clause, for all intents and purposes, prohibits all state taxation of interstate commerce, except those done solely for the support of the state's own government.
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 10 (1824).
A second approach focused upon the question of whether the state's regulation
had an effect that was primarily national or local in character. Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852). Here, the latter regulation was within the
taxing power of the states while the former was not. Id. at 319; accord Gloucester
Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203-04 (1885); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 35, 42 (1868); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 726-27 (1866).
The Court's third approach looked for congressional action-or inaction-in the
area of a particular state taxation before ruling on the validity of the tax. Under this
approach, where the power of Congress to regulate was exclusive, states were allowed to regulate matters of local concern only in the absence of previous congressional regulation. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 493 (1887);
Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 248 (1873).
The Court's fourth approach queried whether the state tax placed interstate
commerce at a commercial disadvantage because of the risk of multiple taxation.
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255-59 (1938). Although
condemning state taxes which would be cumulative, the Western Court stated that
" '[elven interstate business must pay its way.' " Id. at 254 (quoting Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919)). The Court stated that, in
order for a state tax to be upheld, it should not cause "cumulative burdens [upon
interstate commerce] not imposed on local commerce." Western, 303 U.S. at 256.
A fifth approach appeared to place more value on form than on substance.
Under the direct-indirect approach, a state tax upon interstate commerce was upheld
if indirectly levied but struck down if found to be "a direct tax on interstate sales."
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946). Taken to its extreme, the Court struck
down taxes levied upon "the privilege of carrying on exclusive interstate [commerce]
in [a] State." Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608 (1951), over-
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gress enjoyed nearly complete control over the regulation of
interstate commerce. 54 This exclusive control, however, eroded over
time. 5 5 Presently, courts analyze state taxation using a case by case
analysis of due process and Commerce Clause implications of the
tax. 56 This section will provide an overview of the Supreme Court's
treatment of sales and use taxes on interstate commerce with a view
toward how the Court's past rulings may affect the newly enacted
MinnesotaCare.57
1. The Early Decisions
The Commerce Clause initially granted the federal government almost total power to regulate interstate commerce. 58 At one time, the
Commerce Clause was considered an exclusive grant of authority to
Congress to regulate the area of interstate commerce. 5 9 The plenary
power of Congress over such commerce, however, was just one of
many approaches applied by the Supreme Court over the past two
ruled by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). This test proved
difficult to apply because the direct-indirect distinction was too nebulous.
The formalistic approach used in Hewit and Spector gave way to a new approach
containing a more concrete, substantive basis to judge the legality of state taxation.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). The Complete Auto
Transit test remains good law and sets forth a four-pronged analysis. Id.; accord Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1992); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S.
252, 257 (1989); D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 29 (1988). See also infra
note 92 and accompanying text.
54. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
55. One cogent example of the erosion of Commerce Clause power is that state
taxation, which in the past would have been considered a usurpation of Congress'
plenary power to regulate interstate commerce, has been increasingly allowed especially when viewed by the Court as an effort by the state to support its government.
See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328-29 (1977).
56. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
57. For a more complete discussion of the history of state taxation on interstate
commerce and the ramifications of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, see
HARTMAN, supra note 53.
58. See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
59. Throughout much of this nation's history, no federal legislation restricted
the power of the states to tax interstate commerce. Initially, because of holdings
such as Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), there was no need for
Congress to adopt such legislation. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall summarized the
issue well: "[W]hen a State proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or
among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress,
and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do." Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 (1824).
As time passed, however, the Supreme Court's stance on the role of state taxation of interstate commerce changed. See HARTMAN, supra note 53. To avoid losing
even more of its power under the Commerce Clause, Congress moved to adopt legislation restricting the power of the states to tax interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 381 (1988); see also infra note 75.
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hundred years. 60
Early cases involving interstate commerce granted little, if any,
power to the states to tax business transacted across their borders. 6 '
In Leloup v. Port of Mobile,62 the Supreme Court unequivocally held
that "no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any
form."63 Yet, efforts by the states to impose taxes upon the transactions of interstate commerce continued. Eventually, the hard-line
approach originally espoused by the Court gave way to a more flexible line of reasoning.
After Leloup, the Court vacillated between two distinct approaches
regarding state taxation of interstate commerce. The first analysis
was the "direct-indirect burden" approach. 64 Under this approach,
courts sought to determine whether the burdens placed upon interstate commerce by the tax were direct or indirect. 65 Typically, a tax
was characterized as indirect if it was imposed only upon a purely
local business activity that the courts viewed as having little effect on
interstate commerce. 6 6 This approach proved difficult to apply on a
consistent basis,67 and eventually the Court focused upon the likelihood that state taxes might impose a risk of multiple taxation on corporations involved in interstate commerce. 68 The Court, however,
60. See HARTMAN, supra note 53.
61. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888); see also HARTMAN, supra note 53.
62. 127 U.S. 640 (1888).
63. Id. at 648 (stating that this conclusion was the most recent in a line of identical holdings and citing Ratterman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U.S. 411 (1888);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347 (1887); Philadelphia & Southern
Mail S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing
Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887); Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557
(1886); Pickard v. Pullman S. Car Co., 117 U.S. 34 (1886); Walling v. Michigan, 116
U.S. 446 (1886); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885); Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885); Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U.S. 69 (1884); Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1882); County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691
(1881); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878); Reading
R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873)). Further, the Court recognized a
state's right to tax the property of those engaged in interstate commerce or to regulate matters of "local" concern. Leloup, 127 U.S. at 649.
64. See HARTMAN, supra note 53.
65. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946); Minnesota v. Blasius,
290 U.S. 1, 8 (1933); Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252 (1929);
Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 563 (1925); Kansas City, Fort Scott &
Memphis Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227, 231 (1916).
66. See HARTMAN, supra note 53.
67. The major difficulty encountered by the Court in utilizing the direct-indirect
approach existed because of the inability to delineate a workable standard as to exactly what constituted either a direct or indirect burden. See id.
68. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); see also
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford,
305 U.S. 434 (1939); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). The
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has not strictly adhered to this approach but has continued to use
both approaches in searching for an effective analysis to resolve the
69
taxation cases.
2.

Modern Trends

By 1959, the unrestricted freedom from state taxation for interstate commerce ended. Northwestern States PortlandCement Co. v. Minnesota70 held that the net income of an out-of-state corporation
engaged solely in interstate commerce could be taxed by a state
where the corporation did business.71 The Court determined that
Northwestern States Cement's activities formed a "sufficient nexus"
between the tax and the transaction.72 The Court also held that the
State of Minnesota had provided enough services to Northwestern
States Cement to ask for the tax in return. 73 The Court, however,
qualified its holding: (1) the tax was limited to income derived only
from local activities of the corporation within the taxing state; and
(2) there must exist a "sufficient nexus" between the taxation and
the corporation's local activities within the state.7 4 Moreover, the
Court stated that any state tax levied upon interstate commerce must
comport with both Due Process and Commerce Clause
requirements.

75

"new" standard has been referred to as a "multiple taxation doctrine." Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1911 (1992).
69. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946).
70. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Northwestern States Cement was decided along with Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc. v. Williams, 101 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. 1957). Id. Northwestern
States Cement involved an Iowa corporation conducting business in Minnesota by soliciting orders, maintaining a three-room office, and receiving claims for lost or damaged goods during shipments to Minnesota purchasers. Id. at 454-55. The state tax,
which was upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court, sought to impose upon in-state
and out-of-state corporations a tax on the taxable net income derived from sales
made within the state. Id. at 453.
Stockham involved a Delaware valve and pipe fitting manufacturer that maintained a sales and service office in Atlanta. Id. at 455. Stockham engaged in soliciting, receiving, and forwarding of orders from its Georgia office to its home office in
Birmingham, Alabama. Id. at 456. In neither case did the out-of-state corporation
own real property within the taxing state. Id. at 454, 456. Unlike the Northwestern
States Cement decision, Stockham was on appeal after being struck down by the Georgia
Supreme Court as violating the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Federal
Constitution. Id. at 452.
71. Id. at 464-65.
72. Id. at 464.
73. Id. at 465 (quoting Wisconsin v.J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).
74. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 464
(1959).
75. Id. at 464-65. The Court limited its discussion of due process to a cursory
observation that each corporation had the requisite "minimum contacts" to justify
the state tax. Id.
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Later that same year, Congress enacted a statute to limit the power
of the states to tax interstate business transactions.76 The statute
provided two means by which out-of-state corporations could avoid
state taxation.77 First, no tax could be levied upon a corporation
whose only business activities in the taxing state consisted of the solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal property that were
subsequently rejected or approved and filled for delivery from a location outside of the taxing state. 78 Second, no tax could be levied if
the business activities consisted of a solicitation of orders to a prospective customer, so long as the order fell into the description given
in the first exception. 7 9
76. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1988). The statute reads as follows:
(a) Minimum standards
No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for
any taxable year ending after September 14, 1959 a net income tax on the
income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce if
the only business activities within such State by or on behalf of such person
during such taxable year are either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative,in such
State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside
the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment
or delivery from a point outside the state; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such
State in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such
person, if orders by such customer to such person to enable such customer
to fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).
(b) Domestic corporations; persons domiciled in or residents of a State
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the imposition of a net income tax by any State, or political subdivision thereof, with
respect to(1) any corporation which is incorporated under the laws of such State; or
(2) any individual who, under the laws of such State, is domiciled in, or a
resident of, such State.
(c) Sales or solicitation of orders for sales by independent contractors
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person shall not be considered to have engaged in business activities within a State during any taxable
year merely by reason of sales in such State, or the solicitation of orders for
sales in such State, of tangible personal property on behalf of such person
by one or more independent contractors, or by reason of the maintenance,
of an office in such State by one or more independent contractors whose
activities on behalf of such person in such State consist solely of making
sales, or soliciting orders for sales, or [sic] tangible personal property.
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section(1) the term "independent contractor" means a commission agent, broker,
or other independent contractor who is engaged in selling, or soliciting orders for the sale of, tangible personal property for more than one principal
and who holds himself out as such in the regular course of his business activities; and
(2) the term "representative" does not include an independent contractor.

Id.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1988).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1) (1988).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(2) (1988).
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Subsequent court decisions have confirmed the implications of the
statutory language that an out-of-state corporation is immune to
state taxation even if it maintains an office within the state if its business activities relate solely to the solicitation of orders.80
B.

National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

In 1967, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether a
state could impose a use tax8 ' upon an out-of-state corporation
whose only contacts with the taxing state were through the United
States postal service or by common carrier. 8 2 In National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue,83 the State of Illinois sought to tax a

mail-order house corporation. 84 The Court ruled that regulation of
a mail-order house was of "exclusive interstate character," 8 5 thus
regulation of such an operation fell solely under the Commerce
86
Clause and therefore completely under the control of Congress.
Of particular importance in determining the interstate character was
the fact that Bellas Hess maintained no "retail outlets, solicitors, or
property within [the] state." 8 7 Thus, the Court continued to require
a corporation's physical presence within a state before allowing any
taxation.88
Following Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court again faced "the perennial problem of the validity of a state tax . . .related to a corpora80. National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551
(1977); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); West Publishing Co. v.
McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
81. A use tax has been defined as "a levy on the privilege of using within the
taxing state property purchased outside the state, if the property would have been
subject to the sales tax had it been purchased at home." King v. L. & L. Marine Serv.
Inc., 647 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), overruled by Director of Revenue v.
Superior Aircraft Leasing Co., 734 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1987). Such taxes are commonly used by states to protect their respective sales taxes by removing the incentive
for their residents to purchase items from other states having lower sales taxes. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 577
(1983).
82. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 754
(1967). Bellas Hess involved a mail order house that maintained its principal place of
business in Missouri but was incorporated in Delaware. Id. at 753-54. The company's only contacts with Illinois consisted of issuing bi-annual catalogues, occasional
advertising "flyers [to] . . .past and potential customers," and delivery of ordered
goods. Id. at 754. All of the contacts were conducted exclusively through the mail.
Id.
83. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
84. Id. at 753.
85. Id. at 759.
86. Id. at 759-60.
87. Id. at 758.
88. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758
(1967).
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tion's operation of an interstate business." 8 9 In Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, the Court examined a state sales tax that allegedly violated the Commerce Clause by taxing an out-of-state corporation for
the privilege of engaging in business within the State of Mississippi.90 Rejecting a previous line of cases, the Court held the statute
did not offend the Commerce Clause.91 In addition, the Court set
forth a four-pronged test to determine whether a state tax will withstand a Commerce Clause challenge. Under Complete Auto Transit the
tax:
(1)
the
(2)
(3)
(4)

must be applied to an activity having a substantial nexus with
taxing state;
must be fairly apportioned;
must not discriminate against interstate commerce; and
92
must be fairly related to the services provided by the state.

This four-pronged test provides the current analysis for any case in93
volving state taxation of interstate commerce.
C.

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota

On May 26, 1992, the Supreme Court decided Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.94 The Court again addressed the level of contact required
between a mail-order business and a state to permit that state to collect a use tax. 9 5 Unlike the Bellas Hess holding, however, Quill featured an extensive discussion of due process and Commerce Clause
considerations that must be addressed in cases involving the imposi96
tion of state taxation upon interstate commerce.
89. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977).
90. Id. The lawsuit arose from a Mississippi statute reading in part: "[t]here is
hereby levied and assessed.., privilege taxes for the privilege of engaging or continuing in business within this state .... " Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-65-13 (1990).
91. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 289. Here, the Court rejected the rule espoused in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), because its
formalistic approach allowed specific words alone to render a statute in violation of
the Commerce Clause, thus it "st[ood] only as a trap for the unwary draftsmen."
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
92. Id. The text of the Complete Auto Transit test reads, in its entirety, as follows:
These decisions have considered not the formal language of the tax statute
but rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax against Commerce
Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by
the State.

Id.
93. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1908 (1992); Goldberg
v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259 (1989); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 617 (1981).
94. 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1909-16. The Court noted that although "every tax that passes contemporary Commerce Clause analysis is also valid under the Due Process Clause, it
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The Court's separation of due process and Commerce Clause considerations is significant. In order to survive a constitutional challenge, state taxation must both be authorized under due process
mandates and meet Commerce Clause requirements.9 7 Due process
constrains a state's authority to tax and concerns the "fundamental
fairness of government activity." 9 8 Commerce Clause considerations are pertinent to the goal of unburdened commerce and the
freedom of trade in general.9 9 The Quill Court attempted to distinguish the requirements of each challenge.lOO
First, the Court addressed the issue of due process in cases of interstate commerce taxation and reiterated the view that "[it] requires
some definite link, some minimum connection between a state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax."ol The Court's
due process discussion expanded upon the Bellas Hess analysis, noting the substantial evolution of due process jurisprudence in the intervening twenty-five years.1 02 Aided by a discussion concerning the
instructive procedural holdings of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,10 3 Shaffer v. Heitner, 104 and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,1 0 5 the
does not follow that the converse is as well true: a tax may be consistent with Due
Process and yet unduly burden interstate commerce." Id. at 1914 n.7. The purpose
of due process, as set forth in the opinion, concerns the issues of "notice" or "fair
warning." Id. at 1913. This purpose may be contrasted with that of the Commerce
Clause, which addresses "structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on
the national economy." Id.
97. Id. at 1909.
98. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1906 (1992).
99. Id. at 1913.
100. Id. at 1909-16.
101. Id. at 1909 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45

(1954)).
102. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1910.
103. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In InternationalShoe, the state of Washington attempted
to tax an out-of-state corporation having few contacts with the state. Id. The corporation maintained no offices in the state and employed only a few salespersons who
solicited orders from residents. Id. at 315. The corporation then approved and
mailed the orders. Id. at 314. From these facts, the Supreme Court held that the
corporation was within Washington's in personam jurisdiction because sufficient minimum contacts existed and that bringing suit in Washington did not offend the
Court's "traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 320.
104. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Shaffer involved a shareholder's derivative suit by a
plaintiff who sought jurisdiction in Delaware. Id. Although none of the alleged misconduct took place there and none of defendants had any contacts with the state, the
Supreme Court held that no in rem jurisdiction existed, stating that "all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny. Id. at 212.
105. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). In Burger King, the Court held that as long as a commercial entity's efforts are "purposefully directed" toward residents in another state, the
lack of physical contacts with that state will not prevent personal jurisdiction over the
entity. Id. at 476.
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Court held that due process does not require a corporation to be
physically present within a state to be subject to taxation.10 6 Accordingly, the Court overruled all previous holdings stating otherwise.107
Next, the Court addressed the role of the Commerce Clause in
state taxation of interstate commerce cases.10 8 Careful to emphasize
the purpose of the Commerce Clause as distinct from due process,
the Court stated that (1) the substantial nexus requirement serves to
limit state burdens upon interstate commerce;' 0 9 (2) a corporation
lacks a "substantial nexus" with a taxing state when the only contacts
between them are through the United States mail or common carrier;"It 0 and (3) a corporation's activities may fail to fulfill the requirements for taxation imposed by the Commerce Clause but yet satisfy
those requirements imposed by due process."'l
The Court also endorsed the Complete Auto Transit "substantial
nexus" analysis and indicated that a substantial nexus is more than
the requirement of "minimum contacts" under due process.1 2 Quill
further indicated that the substantial nexus may be satisfied by the
physical presence of the corporation within the state's borders.1l3
But the Court expressly stated that physical presence is not vital to a
finding of substantial nexus."14
Clearly, substantial nexus is more easily contrasted than delineated. The Quill Court provided some guidance by affirming its holding in Bellas Hess.' 5 The Bellas Hess "bright-line" test provides a

protective shield for out-of-state corporations against state taxation
when the corporation's only contact with the state is through the
106. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1911 (1992). Utilizing International Shoe, the Court noted that due process demands that a defendant have "certain
minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. at 1910 (quoting
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The Court cited
Shaffer to express the idea that a corporation conducting more than a minimal
amount of business within a state has "fair warning that [its] activit[ies] may subject
[it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Id. at 1911 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). Finally, the
Court cited Burger King in support of the proposition that "jurisdiction . . . may not
be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State."
Id. at 1910 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
107. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1911.
108. Id. at 1911-16.
109. Id. at 1913.
110. Id. at 1912.
111. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1913-16 (1992).
112. Id. at 1912, 1913-14.
113. Id. at 1914.
114. Id. The Court stated that "we have not, in our review of other types of taxes,
articulated the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for
" Id.
sales and use taxes ..
115. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1914-16 (1992).
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mail." 6 The Court promoted the Bellas Hess "bright-line" test as
"good law,"'17 that "firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate
state authority to... collect sales and use taxes"' 18 and "furthers the
ends of the dormant Commerce Clause." ' 1 9 The Court embraced
the "bright-line" Bellas Hess rule because the benefit of its clear
2
guidelines outweighed any objections to its artificial benchmark.1 0
The Court recognized Congress' power to regulate commerce, but
in the absence of concrete legislation governing such transactions,
the Court did not further define the standard. The Court indicated
that the amorphous "substantial nexus" requires something more
than "minimum contacts" but something less than unequivocal physical presence'21 and that only Congress has the authority to place
22
restrictions on such interstate commerce.'
Through its holding in Quill and its affirmation of Bellas Hess, the
Supreme Court held that, barring any congressional action on the
matter, states will be restricted from taxing out-of-state mail-order
houses having only minimal contacts with the state.12 3 The holding,
although restricted to only mail-order houses, logically would seem
to extend to other corporations with a similar lack of contacts. 124
116. Id. at 1914.
117. Id. at 1916. The Court upheld Bellas Hess because its "bright-line" rule works
especially well for mail-order houses and because the established rule had "encourage[d] settled expectations and, in doing so, foster[ed] investment by businesses
and individuals." Id. at 1915.
118. Id. at 1915.
119. Id. at 1914.
120. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1915 (1992).
121. In Quill, the Court noted that the underlying issues of the case presented
problems that "Congress may be better qualified to resolve, . .. [and] has the ultimate power to resolve." Id. at 1916. In reaffirming the "bright-line" test of Bellas
Hess, the Court noted that Congress recognized the tension surrounding taxation of
mail-order houses but had failed to pass any legislation to "overrule" Bellas Hess. Id.
at 1916 n. 11. Finally, the Court indicated that no further changes would be made to
the judicially created body of law because the final say in the matter fell within the
power of Congress. Id.
122. Id. at 1916.
123. In both Quill and Bellas Hess, the minimal contact occurred through the
United States mail or by common carrier. Although this is the only type of contact, to
date, that has afforded corporations taxation immunity, it remains to be seen if other
substantially similar minimum contacts will provide the same protection.
124. In Quill, the Court upheld Bellas Hess as good law. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1912.
Specifically, the Court has cited Bellas Hess with approval in Goldberg v. Sweet, 488
U.S. 252, 263 (1989) (doubting whether termination of an interstate telephone call,
alone, would constitute a "substantial nexus"); D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486
U.S. 24, 33 (1988); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626
(1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980); National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559 (1977).
The Court's comment in Goldberg is insightful with regard to the MinnesotaCare
tax on out-of-state health care providers. The Goldberg Court intimated that termina-
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While the Supreme Court's position on the subject seems quite welldefined at this time, one can speculate as to the prospective effect of
the Court's holding upon the sales and use tax imposed upon nonresident health care providers via MinnesotaCare.
IV.

MINNESOTACARE: TAXATION OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
ENGAGED SOLELY IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Ample case law supports the theory that interstate business activities are susceptible to taxation.12 5 Now the question becomes at
what point do the activities establish a nexus with the state such as to
allow for the imposition of the tax? The Supreme Court's most recent opinion demonstrates that the answer is found by application of
Due Process and Commerce Clause analyses.1 2 6 Under these analyses MinnesotaCare's tax of nonresident health care providers fails to
pass constitutional muster.
A.

The Cornerstone of MinnesotaCare'sJurisdiction to Tax: Article 9,
Section 6

The Minnesota Legislature confronted the issue of taxing health
care providers located beyond the state's borders in Article 9 of the
Act. The relevant statutory language reads:
A hospital or health care provider is subject to tax .

.

. if it is

'transacting business in Minnesota.' A hospital or health care provider is transacting business in Minnesota only if it: (1) maintains
an office in Minnesota; (2) has employees, representatives, or independent contractors conducting business in Minnesota; (3) regularly sells covered services to customers that receive the covered
services in Minnesota; (4) regularly solicits business from potential
customers in Minnesota; (5) regularly performs services outside
Minnesota the benefits of which are consumed in Minnesota; (6)
owns or leases tangible personal or real property physically located in Minnesota; or (7) receives medical assistance payments
tion of an interstate phone call, alone, would be too attenuated to constitute a "substantial nexus." Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 263. Using similar reasoning, one can arrive at
the same conclusion regarding MinnesotaCare's presumption of solicitation where an
out-of-state health care provider serves twenty or more Minnesota residents. Without something more in the way of contacts the services-like the Goldberg phone
call-would probably be too attenuated to support a finding of any "substantial
nexus."
125. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992); Goldberg v.
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989); D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988);
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987);
Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977).
126. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1909-11.
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from the state of Minnesota. 127
The Act also creates the following presumption:
A hospital or health care provider is presumed to regularly solicit
business within Minnesota if it receives gross receipts for covered
services from 20 or more patients domiciled in Minnesota in a cal28
endar year.'
While the statutory language was carefully drafted to comply with
previous federal legislation and case law, it diverges from the accepted standard in provision (4) and the associated presumption.129
According to the statutory language, the mere solicitation of and
subsequent providing of health care services to twenty or more customers from within the state of Minnesota will subject a nonresident
health care provider to the two percent gross revenue tax, without
any other contacts with Minnesota.130 The viability of this particular
provision was questioned during the bill's journey through the legislature. 3 After debating the provision, the clause remained intact in
the final version. Applying the appropriate due process and Com127. MINN. STAT. § 295.51(1) (1992).
128. Id. § 295.51(2).
129. MinnesotaCare sets forth seven different clauses to determine whether an
out-of-state business is "transacting business in Minnesota." Id. §§ 295.51 (1)(l)(1)(7) (1992). See also supra text accompanying note 127. These clauses are closely
modeled after previous case law and federal legislation. For example, the Supreme
Court has found that maintaining an office within a state is sufficient to subject a
corporation's business activities to state taxation. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Also, employing representatives or
employees to conduct business within a state has led to similar liability. Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). Finally, corporate ownership of
property physically located within a taxing state has been enough to subject out-ofstate corporate business activities to state taxation. National Geographic Soc'y v.
California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
130. MINN. STAT. §§ 295.51(1)(4), (2) (1992).
131. During the House Taxes Committee Hearings on MinnesotaCare, the ability
of article 9, section 6 to withstand a challenge in the courts was questioned. House
Taxes Comm., Tape 1 (April 8, 1992). In particular, Senator Glen Olson asked one
of the bill's sponsor's, "[a]re you saying that hospitals that are located over the border, but are delivering services to Minnesota residents will pay the tax for services
provided to Minnesota residents?" Id. After further discussion with no definitive
answer supplied, Senator Joe Bertram quipped, "[tihe only thing that I have heard
from you folks is that the lawyers are still talking, but there is no actuality that any of
these [provisions] are going to be able to be implemented the way that you want
them to be implemented." Id.
Arguably all bills passed into law have the potential to be challenged and struck
down for a variety of reasons. In the case of this particular law, however, it seems
that Senator Bertram's remark was on target. Although the objectives of the legislation are commendable, a close analysis of Quill exhibits that the taxation of out-ofstate health care providers is beyond Minnesota's power. Perhaps the bill's authors
were aware of the shortcomings but sought to get a version of the bill passed before
the end of the term. As SenatorJoanne Benson, one of the co-authors, stated during
the hearings, "[tihis is not perfect legislation and it will be rewritten many times, I
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merce Clause analyses, the provision fails to withstand a constitutional challenge.
B.

Due Process Considerations

The Supreme Court's holding in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota13 2 is
instructive regarding the requirements of due process for state taxation of interstate commerce.13 3 The overriding concerns of due process require that before a state can tax interstate commerce there
must be a sufficient connection or contact between a foreign corporation's business activities and the state to establish the state's jurisdiction to tax. While there exists no per se requirement of the
corporation's physical presence within the taxing state to establish
such jurisdiction, more often than not this is how the requirement is
satisfied. If the corporation is not physically present within the state,
the contact must be sufficient enough to place the corporation on
notice that its business activities may subject it to the state's
jurisdiction.
In the case of most health care providers, due process requirements will provide only a small hurdle for MinnesotaCare. Any provider physically located within Minnesota, maintaining office space,
or employing agents within the state is unequivocally within the
state's tax jurisdiction.134 The difficulty arises when, for example,
Hospital XYZ, located solely in Grand Forks, North Dakota, provides
health care services to twenty or more Minnesotans within one
year. 13 5
Under the present language of MinnesotaCare, even assuming that
Hospital XYZ maintains no other contacts with Minnesota, the hospital will be subject to a two percent tax on the gross revenues received
suspect, in the next decade. But it is a start and it is an opportunity for this state to
be a model for other states and ultimately for the nation." Id.
132. 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
133. Id. at 1909-16.
134. A health care provider that maintains office space within the State of Minnesota and provides services to its residents is within the state's jurisdiction to tax because, in so doing, the provider fulfills all four prongs of the Complete Auto Transit test.
See supra note 92.
135. In testimony before the Minnesota Legislature, Dr. F. Mark Carter on behalf
of the Grand Forks Clinic, Ltd. in North Dakota voiced opposition to enactment of

MinnesotaCare.

SENATE TAXES COMM. HEARING ON MINNESOTACARE, TESTIMONY OF

DR. F. MARK CARTER (Apr. 2, 1992). The Grand Forks Clinic has a network of satellite branches located throughout the northwestern region of Minnesota. Id. at 1.
Carter stated that MinnesotaCare "is going to have a severe negative impact on physician recruitment and retention." Id. This in turn will lead to decreased services to
residents of the state who live in the affected area. Carter further argued that,
although physicians may pass on the costs to insurers, in reality the cost would be
borne by "the salaries of the hard-working primary care physicians who service ...
patients in Northwestern Minnesota." Id.
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as a result of the services provided to Minnesota residents.136 Because Hospital XYZ provided health care services for twenty Minnesotans, it is presumed to have "regularly solicit[ed] business" from
Minnesota. 137
This conclusion is not only unjustified but also violates the underlying due process principles. In the above hypothetical, Hospital
XYZ is located beyond the boundaries of Minnesota. Thus, something other than the physical presence of the corporation must satisfy the notice requirement of state taxation jurisdiction. Second, the
hospital maintains no personnel, office space, property, or agency in
Minnesota. This leaves only the existence of "solicitation" as a possible basis for claiming that the hospital has a connection with the
state. Assuming that Hospital XYZ has not undertaken an extensive
advertising campaign, the existence of its "solicitation" rests solely
on MinnesotaCare's statutory presumption based on the number of
Minnesotans provided health care services.1 38 This connection is
tenuous at best.
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,139 the Supreme Court stated that a

business "engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State ...has 'fair warning that its activities may subject
136.

MINN. STAT. § 295.51 (1992). See also supra text accompanying note 130.
137. Id. § 295.51(4) (1992).
138. Although never defined in MinnesotaCare, it is apparent that solicitation is
very closely connected to substantial nexus. Thus, it is crucial to establish the proper
definition of solicitation in determining constitutional challenges. The Supreme
Court has held that an out-of-state corporation lacks a sufficient nexus with a taxing
state unless it invades or exploits that state's consumer market. Miller Bros. Co. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 347 (1954). In Miller Bros., a Delaware corporation was
found not to have exploited Maryland's consumer market even though it had (1)
advertised on radio and in print in Maryland; (2) mailed sales flyers to former customers in Maryland; and (3) delivered some purchases, using its own vehicles, to
common carriers in Maryland. Id. at 341-42. The Court emphasized the fact that
sales were made without the use of agents in Maryland and with "no solicitation other
than the incidental effects of general advertising." Id. at 346-47 (emphasis added).
Conversely, the Supreme Court has held that a Georgia-based corporation employing ten salespersons conducting continuous solicitation in Florida established a
sufficient nexus to justify a Florida state tax. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207
(1960). In support of its position, the Court cited the fact that property was
purchased by Florida residents and entered into the state and that the only aspect of
the sale that was not local in character was the acceptance of the sales order. Id. at
211.
MinnesotaCare appears to be more closely analogous to the situation in liller
Bros. Nonresident health care providers will not likely employ agents to solicit outof-state health services to Minnesotans such as was the case in Scripto. Further, no
tangible property would be brought back into the state by residents who have received such services. Finally, it appears that mere advertising by radio, television, or
printed media will not, in the absence of more, be enough to evoke the statutory
presumption of solicitation.
139. 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
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it to the jurisdiction of [that state]."14o Although Quill involved a
mail-order house whose solicitation with the taxing state occurred
solely through the United States mail or by common carrier, the
Court's reasoning is equally applicable to this situation.
Solicitation by the foreign corporation must be proven by specific
facts.14 1 Under MinnesotaCare, proof of solicitation exists only by
virtue of the statutory presumption. The presumption is utilized to
prove the ultimate fact. The statute itself defines solicitation
through the presumption, namely that because twenty or more Minnesotans were served, solicitation exists.I42 The reasoning is circu-

lar and, in fact, no solicitation whatsoever is established. Due
process dictates that something more than MinnesotaCare's presumptive language is required to establish Minnesota's jurisdiction
to tax out-of-state health care providers.
C.

Commerce Clause Considerations

Even assuming that the tax provision meets due process requirements, another hurdle must be cleared before the state may impose
the tax. The tax must also withstand Commerce Clause challenges
which, according to the Supreme Court, typically provide a more
stringent test. 143 The Commerce Clause analysis serves to limit state
burdens on interstate commerce and is guided by the four-pronged
Complete Auto Transit test. 144
1.

Application of the Complete Auto Transit Test

In 1977, the Supreme Court held that a state tax on interstate
business activities would survive a Commerce Clause challenge only
if the tax meets four requirements.145
The first requirement from Complete Auto Transit is that the taxed
business activity must have a substantial nexus with the taxing
state. 146 Although the exact meaning of this term is somewhat nebulous, it falls somewhere between actual physical presence and
"slightest presence."' 147 Because the focus of the nexus requirement
140. Id. at 1911 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977)).
141. See supra note 138.
142. MINN. STAT. § 295.51 (1992).
143. The Court stated that "a corporation may have the 'minimum contacts' with a
taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the 'substantial
nexus' with that State as required by the Commerce Clause." Quill, 112 S. Ct. at
1913-14; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
145. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). See supra
notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
146. Id.
147. In National Geographic the Court expressly rejected the California Supreme
Court's 'slightest presence' standard of constitutional nexus." National Geographic
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is to limit state burdens on interstate commerce, the term need not
be specifically defined to be effectively applied. Although a corporation's activities may have a connection with a taxing state, any state
taxation may be prohibited upon a finding that the nexus between
the two does not justify the burden.148
Applying the hypothetical involving Hospital XYZ located in
Grand Forks, North Dakota, the MinnesotaCare tax fails to survive a
Commerce Clause challenge. The hospital is not physically located
within the state of Minnesota; hence, the substantial nexus must be
established in a different manner. One possible method by which
this may be accomplished is by arguing that XYZ is present because
it advertised or solicited. Even so, it is unlikely that the hospital's
general solicitation, without proof that XYZ specifically targeted
Minnesota, would satisfy the nexus requirement.14 9
The Commerce Clause analysis could include every health care facility in close proximity to Minnesota that provides a convenient or
necessary outlet for health care for Minnesotans. Merely providing
services to more than twenty people could be legally considered as
creating a substantial nexus for Minnesota to obtain jurisdiction to
tax.150 But this argument will not stand in light of previous Commerce Clause decisions. The mere fact that twenty Minnesota residents leave the state to receive health care creates neither a
substantial nexus between the health care provider and Minnesota
nor justifies taxation of the service.i51
Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977). Under such a test, the
California Supreme Court stated that:
[w]here an out-of-state seller conducts a substantial mail order business with
residents of a state imposing a use tax on such purchasers and the seller's
connection with the taxing state is not exclusively by means of the instruments of interstate commerce, the slightest presence within such taxing
state independent of any connection through interstate commerce will permit the state constitutionally to impose on the seller the duty of collecting
the use tax from such mail order purchasers and the liability for failure to do
so.

Id. at 556.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that the corporation had
maintained significant contacts greater than just a slight presence. Id. Further, the
Court held that the nexus between the state and corporation need not be closely
associated with the activity that the state sought to tax. Id. at 560. In assessing the
tax imposed by MinnesotaCare, the statutory presumption that gives Minnesota the
power to tax, establishes only a "slightest presence" rather than a "substantial
nexus."
148. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1913-14 (1992).
149. A similar question was raised in Quill. See infra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
150. MINN. STAT. § 295.51 (1992).
151. In Quill, the Supreme Court stated that the state tax was illustrative as an
undue burden on interstate commerce. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1913 n.6. The state law
imposed a duty to collect a use tax upon each out-of-state vendor that advertised
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The second Complete Auto requirement is that the tax be fairly apportioned.152 For a tax to be fairly apportioned, the tax burden must
reflect a proportional relationship to the fraction of interstate activity
taking place within the taxing state.' 5 3 Thus, if a corporation transacts fifteen percent of its gross sales in a particular state, a tax of
fifteen percent on total gross sales would be fairly apportioned.l54MinnesotaCare narrowly defines gross revenues of nonresident health care providers to include only income generated from
services provided to individuals living in Minnesota.t 5 5 All taxed
revenue is generated by Minnesota residents and the two percent tax
is a fair reflection of a nonresident corporation's interstate activity
conducted with Minnesota residents.156 Thus, the MinnesotaCare
two percent tax on gross revenues' 5 7 satisfies the requirement of fair
apportionment.
Under the third Complete Auto Transit requirement, the tax must not
discriminate against interstate commerce.15 8 This requirement prohibits state taxation that provides a direct commercial advantage to
three or more times in one year in the North Dakota. Id.; see also infra note 168.

Using this rationale, it is difficult to conclude that Minnesota can premise the MinnesotaCare tax liability on the out-of-state furnishing of health services to twenty or
more Minnesotans.
152. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).

153. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978). In Moorman, the Court
stated that "the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally
related to 'values connected with the taxing State.' " Id. (quoting Norfolk & Western

Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968)). The Court further held that the
Iowa single-factor formula and the commonly used three-factor (property, payroll
and sales) formula for determining tax liability are both valid unless proven otherwise by "clear and cogent" evidence. Id. at 274.
154. The Supreme Court subsequently established a two-component test requiring both internal and external consistency to satisfy fair apportionment. Container
Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). Internal consistency requires
a tax formula that, if applied by all states, would result in no more than all of a
corporation's income being taxed. Id. The external consistency component extended the view espoused in Moorman by requiring state apportionment formulas to
"actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated." Id.
155. MINN. STAT. § 295.50(3)(a)(4) (1992). Specifically, gross revenues are defined as "total amounts received in money or otherwise by .. .a nonresident health
care provider for covered services .. .provided to an individual domiciled in Minnesota." Id.
156. Because Minnesota has limited itself to taxing only revenue generated within
its borders, even a higher flat tax rate would, arguably, be fairly apportioned. See
Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 562-64 (1975)
(upholding a tax apportioned exactly to only the intrastate activities being taxed).
The MinnesotaCare tax satisfies the twin requirements of internal and external consistency by avoiding the pitfall of multiple taxation by providing a tax credit to health
care providers that are subject to taxation on the identical services by another state.
MINN. STAT. § 295.54
157. MINN. STAT. §

(1992).
295.52 (1992).

158. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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local businesses, thereby discriminating against those in other
states.15 9 The "practical effect of [the] challenged tax" is the touchstone in determining discrimination.160 In any case, the MinnesotaCare tax cannot be characterized as discriminatory because it taxes
resident and nonresident health care providers identically.161
The fourth Complete Auto Transit test factor requires that the tax be
fairly related to the services provided by the state. 162 Fair relation is
closely tied to the existence of a substantial nexus and requires that
the measure of the tax be "reasonably related to the extent of the
contact [with the taxing state]."163 Generally, state taxes satisfy this
requirement when a corporation derives some benefit, although not
necessarily directly, from a society or community, including police
and fire protection and the use of a well-trained work force.164
In the case of nonresident health care providers, each of these
benefits is absent. A hospital outside of Minnesota receives no benefit from Minnesota police or fire fighters. Arguably, the hospital may
benefit somewhat from the use of Minnesota workers, but this possibility diminishes rapidly with its distance from the border. The reason why these services do not benefit nonresident health care
providers is simply because the providers have no physical link with
Minnesota. Yet MinnesotaCare presumes a physical link by attaching
significance to the fact of twenty or more Minnesotans receiving
health services.165 Even if 200 Minnesotans received such services,
many, if not all, nonresident health care providers would likely receive no benefit from the state. Minnesota's misplaced reliance on
the receipt of out-of-state health care services does not render the
MinnesotaCare tax fairly related to any state-provided services.
An example may best illustrate this point. Assume, for instance,
159. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (invalidating a New York statute imposing an elevated tax on interstate stock transactions,
with significant in-state elements, when sold out-state); see also Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc.
v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987) (invalidating a Washington tax on local manufacturers selling to out-of-state customers while exempting
those selling to local customers); Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (invalidating a Delaware tax on out-of-state sellers tangible property at wholesale prices
that exempted local manufacturers because of a higher in-state manufacturing tax).
160. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 615 (1981).
161. MINN. STAT. § 295.50(3) (1992). The statute requires nonresident health
care providers to pay taxes on the exact same services as in-state providers when
"provided to patients domiciled in Minnesota." Id.
162. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
163. Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 626.
164. Id. at 624; see also Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228
(1980); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 435 (1979); General
Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1964), overruled by Tyler Pipe
Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
165. MINN. STAT. § 295.51(2) (1992).
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that a world renowned clinic is located in Eau Claire, Wisconsin. Assume also that the clinic provides medical treatment to people from
all over the United States; thus its services encompass interstate
commerce. Under MinnesotaCare, if twenty Minnesotans seek medical treatment at the Eau Claire clinic, the two percent tax goes into
effect regardless of whether the clinic has any other contacts with the
state of Minnesota.
The tax would discriminate against the clinic itself and generally
against interstate commerce because Minnesota would be attempting
to tax a business activity having only a very attenuated connection, if
any, with the state. Another clinic in Wisconsin, not serving twenty
patients from Minnesota, would not be subject to this tax. Only
when twenty Minnesota residents cross state lines does the tax apply.
Although MinnesotaCare proposes to tax only health care provided
to Minnesotans, it nonetheless violates the Complete Auto Transit test
because the clinic derives little or no benefit from Minnesota, which
implies that the tax is not fairly related to any state-provided services. 166 Hence, it cannot be said that Minnesota "has given anything
1 67
for which it can ask return."

2.

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota

In Quill, North Dakota attempted to collect a use tax from any outof-state "retailer"168 that engaged in three or more advertisements
in the state within a twelve-month period.' 6 9 The district court
struck down the tax finding that no substantial nexus or state-pro166. For a tax to be fairly related to services provided by a state, the taxed corporation must enjoy some benefit from state services. The objective of this requirement
is to "ensure that a State's tax burden is not placed upon persons who do not benefit
from services provided by the State." Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266-67
(1989). Such services, however, need not directly benefit a corporation to be justified. Id. at 267. The focus is placed on the "wide range of benefits provided to the
taxpayer, not just the precise activity connected to the interstate activity issue." Id.
Thus, if a corporation is not physically located in a state and has only minimal contacts with the state, a tax upon the corporation will have difficulty meeting this
requirement.
167. Wisconsin v.J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
168. The North Dakota statute defines retailer as "every person who engages in
regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state." N.D. CENT.
CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (1993). Such solicitation is further defined as three or more
advertisements within a 12-month period. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1
(1988). Thus, as the Supreme Court noted, if allowed to stand, the North Dakota use
tax statute would have allowed the state to impose the tax on "a publisher who included a subscription card in three issues of its magazine, a vendor whose radio advertisements were heard in North Dakota on three occasions, and a corporation
whose telephone sales force made three calls into the State." Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1913 n.6 (1992).
169. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1908.
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vided services existed between North Dakota and Quill.170 In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court intimated that the broad
scope of the state's statutory definition of retailer was illustrative of
how such a tax may well burden interstate commerce.' 7'
MinnesotaCare also establishes a broad definition of "regularly solicit[ing] business from potential customers in Minnesota."1 72
Twenty Minnesota patients receiving health services at any facility
outside Minnesota's borders will subject the facility to the MinnesotaCare tax even in the absence of any other contact with the
state.' 73 Such a low threshold is closely analogous to that imposed
by North Dakota in Quill.1 74 In light of the Court's disposition on a
similar issue in Quill, MinnesotaCare's definition may likely fail to
withstand a constitutional challenge under the Commerce Clause.
V.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the future will see widespread acceptance of governmentsubsidized health insurance whether funded by the federal government or by the states. In any event, Minnesota is to be commended
for its attempt to establish a workable system while others only talk
about making such attempts. As with all new forms of legislation,
however, the drafters must be cognizant of the many intricacies involved in the federal system of government.
MinnesotaCare does an admirable job of creating workable financing for the health insurance subsidies. Nonetheless, it fails to satisfy
the stringent requirements imposed by the Commerce Clause upon
state taxation of interstate commerce. The recent holding in Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota175 reinforces the view that states may not ignore
the requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause. In that respect,
MinnesotaCare has failed.
This attempt to tax out-of-state health care providers is beyond the
reach and power of a state. Minnesota can claim no "substantial
nexus" to such health care providers, and a simple statutory presumption is not enough to remedy the deficiency. Although sound in
its other respects of financing, the portion of the statute utilizing the
twenty patient threshold to invoke the tax will not withstand constitutional challenge under the Commerce Clause.

170. Id.
171. Id. at 1913 n.6.
172. MINN. STAT. §§ 295.51(1)(4), (2) (1992).

173. Id.
174, See supra note 168.
175.

112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
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